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In this paper we study the impact of more transparency in the interbank market on the volume of bank intermediated 
loans and on the profitability of the banking business. Transparency is modeled by means of the informational content 
of publicly observable signals correlated to the random interbank interest rate. We find that more transparency may 
increase or decrease the volume of bank loans. In particular, the impact of more transparency on the volume of loans 
depends on the curvature of the marginal cost function of the banking firm. Furthermore, we find that ex ante expected 










In the wake of turbulences on ﬁnancial markets it is often stressed that greater
transparency in economic policy and in data on economic and ﬁnancial de-
velopments is critical for a strong and smoothly functioning ﬁnancial sector.
While the notion of transparency underlying such statements remains often
vague, it usually refers to disclosure levels and to the quality of disclosure
practices of corporations and oﬃcial bodies. Higher transparency is under-
stood to reduce uncertainty in the decision making of private market partici-
pants thereby permitting actions that are better suited to the circumstances.
In the banking literature, transparency is often identiﬁed with regulations
fostering prudent behavior and accurate information disclosure by ﬁnancial
institutions (Barth et al. (2004), Dangl and Lehar (2004)). An example for
such regulations are the Basel accords which have engendered global con-
vergence of capital standards and harmonization of regulatory guidelines for
banks.
This paper suggests a notion of transparency for the interbank market
and analyzes its role for the banking business. In modeling the banking
business we concentrate exclusively on the activity of banks in performing ﬁ-
nancial intermediation, thereby ignoring some important speciﬁcities of other
banking activities.1 The bank extends loans to investors and sells deposits
to savers at ﬁxed rates. These rates are determined competitively and are
not explained by our model. In order to make the balance sheet balance the
bank may need to purchase or sell funds on the interbank market. The rate
on the interbank market is random (Greenbaum and Thakor (1995), Bessis
(2002)). Therefore, to the extent that ﬁxed rate loans are funded via trading
on the interbank market the bank is exposed to interest rate risk.
The bank has access to a futures market where, in the face of a random
1Typically, earnings from ﬁnancial intermediation account for at least 80 percent of
bank proﬁts (see Mercer (1992)).Transparency in the Interbank Market 3
interbank rate, it can hedge the uncertainties connected with its assets and
liabilities. The terms at which futures contracts are traded depend on the
‘transparency’ of the interbank market.2 Interbank market transparency is
linked to the informativeness of an observable signal which is (imperfectly)
correlated with the future interest rate. The signal conveys some noisy in-
formation about the unknown interbank rate and, therefore, allows the bank
to update its beliefs. The uncertainty to which the bank is exposed when it
decides about loans and deposits depends on the observed signal as well as
on the information system within which the signal can be interpreted. We
characterize the interbank market as more transparent if the signal conveys
more precise information about the unknown interest rate. Thus, more trans-
parency means that the interest rate risk is reduced through the disclosure
of more reliable public information.3
How does more transparency in the interbank market of an economy aﬀect
the loan volume of the banking ﬁrm? The answer depends on the curvature
of the operational marginal cost function: more interest rate transparency
stimulates (reduces) the bank’s loan volume if the marginal cost function is
concave (convex). By contrast, proﬁtability of the ﬁnancial intermediation
business always increase with more interest rate transparency regardless of
technological parameters and of attitudes towards risk as long as the cost
function is convex.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the bank’s
decision problem and introduce the concept of transparency which underlies
our analysis. Section 3 contains the main results: we characterize the impact
2The notion of transparency used in this study is adopted from the work by Drees and
Eckwert (2003). These authors have characterized market transparency using a criterion
which is conceptually related to the literature that emerged from the seminal works by
Blackwell (1953), Dr` eze (1960), and Hirshleifer (1971, 1975).
3In practice, this information may be disclosed by oﬃcial bodies (e.g., government
agencies or central banks), by major market participants with high public visibility, or
even through endogenous market mechanisms.4
of more transparency on the loan volume and on the bank’s expected proﬁts.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider the model of a competitive banking ﬁrm which extends over
two periods. The bank is a classical intermediary, selling deposits D and
extending loans L. In producing the loan services the ﬁnancial intermediary
uses a banking technology which can be represented by a cost function C(L).
This strictly increasing and convex function describes the cost of managing
a volume L of loans.4 The rate on loans, rL, and the rate on deposits, rD,
are both ﬁxed and they satisfy rL > rD.
The equity capital of the bank, K, is assumed to be ﬁxed over the plan-
ning horizon. The issue of deposits has to satisfy a capital requirement by
regulation, i.e. K ≥ (1/k)D.5 The subsequent analysis proceeds on the
assumption that the capital requirement constraint is binding. This assump-
tion will be satisﬁed as long as the rate on loans is suﬃciently higher than
the rate on deposits. Then the quantity of deposits is a ﬁxed fraction of the
bank’s equity capital,
D = kK. (1)
At the beginning of period 0, the bank faces the following balance sheet
constraint:
L + M = K + D, (2)
where M denotes the bank’s net position on the interbank market. If M
is positive (negative), the bank lends (borrows) on the interbank market.
4For simplicity we assume that the sale of deposits does not cause transaction or man-
agement costs. This speciﬁcation can be generalized without aﬀecting the qualitative
results in this paper.
5(1/k) denotes the required minimum capital-to-deposits ratio. See, for example, San-
tomero (1984), Wong (1997), Freixas and Rochet (1998).Transparency in the Interbank Market 5
As mentioned earlier, the rate on deposits, rD, and the rate on loans, rL,
are ﬁxed. Nevertheless the bank faces some uncertainty which stems from a
stochastic rate, ˜ r, on funds borrowed from (or lent to) the interbank market.
The tilde refers to the random nature of the spot interest rate rate which
assumes values in Ω := [r,r], where 0 < r < r < ∞.6 This rate becomes
known only at date 1 when all payments are settled.
Thus, as of date 0 when the bank chooses its loan portfolio, the rate ˜ r on
the interbank market is random. Yet, prior to making the loan decision the
bank observes a signal y. This signal is the realization of a random variable
˜ y which is correlated with ˜ r.7 The signal, therefore, contains information
about the unknown interbank rate. In particular, at the time when the bank
makes its portfolio decision, the relevant expectation for ˜ r is the updated (in
a Bayesian way) posterior belief.
The bank has access to an interest futures market where it can hedge the
uncertainty associated with its assets or liabilities on the interbank market
(Morgan et al. (1988), Greenbaum and Thakor (1995)). The futures market
opens at date 0 after the signal has realized. A futures contract pays r units
of currency at date 1. Let H be the forward commitment of the banking
ﬁrm, i.e., H denotes the number of futures contracts sold by the bank. We
assume that the terms of forward contracting are unbiased, which implies
that the futures market clears at a interest rate rf(y) that is equal to the
conditional mean of a contract’s payoﬀ,
rf(y) = E[˜ r|y]. (3)
Both the payoﬀ and the interest rate of the contract fall due in period 1. The
6A tilde always signiﬁes a random variable. We delete the tilde when referring to a
realization of a random variable.
7The signal might be interpreted as some noisy information linked to market tightness
which becomes known before the interbank market opens. Examples are information about
the foreign exchange position of the central bank, indicators of inﬂationary pressure, and
information about ﬁscal and monetary policy more generally.6
timing of events is as follows (see Figure 1):




signal y is observed;
interest futures market opens;
the bank chooses D, L and H.
inter bank rate r realizes;
all contracts are settled.
Figure 1
2.1 The Decision Problem of the Bank
The bank maximizes expected utility, deﬁned over random proﬁts,
˜ Π = rLL + ˜ rM − rDD − C(L) + H
 
rf(y) − ˜ r

. (4)
M = D+K−L is the net position of the bank on the interbank market. This
net position represents the funds which are sold (or purchased, if negative)
on the interbank market in order to balance the bank’s balance sheet. Proﬁts
are realized in period 1 based on the rate r on the interbank market.
Using (1) and (2), proﬁts may be rewritten as
˜ Π = (rL − ˜ r)L + [˜ r(1 + k) − rDk]K − C(L) + H
 
rf(y) − ˜ r

. (5)
The bank’s problem may thus be written
max
L,H
E[U(˜ Π)], (6)Transparency in the Interbank Market 7
where U : R → R is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable utility function. The bank maximizes (6) with respect to
loan production, L, and forward commitment H. The necessary ﬁrst-order


















rf(y) − ˜ r

= 0. (8)




∗) = rL − rf(y), (9)
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Next we deﬁne our notion of interbank market transparency. The trans-
parency on the interbank market will be linked to the informational content
of the signal y.
2.2 Information Systems and Interbank Market Transparency
We identify the transparency of the interbank market with the ‘informative-
ness’ of the signal y ∈ Y ⊂ R, which is observed by the bank.9 The informa-
tiveness of the signal depends on the information system within which signals
can be interpreted. An information system, denoted by g, speciﬁes for each
state of nature, r, a conditional probability function over the set of signals:
g(y|r). The positive real number g(y|r) deﬁnes the conditional probability
8Condition (10) follows from (8) since, according to (3), the futures market is unbiased.
9This concept of transparency is due to Drees and Eckwert (2003). Studying issues of
international trade, these authors have applied the concept to markets of foreign exchange.8
(density) that the signal y will be observed if the true (yet unknown) state
of nature is r. The bank knows the function g(y|r) by which the signals are
generated, given the state of nature. Using Bayes’s rule, the bank revises its
expectations and maximizes utility on the basis of the updated beliefs.
Let π : Ω → R+ be the (Lebesgue-) density function for the prior dis-





g(y|r)π(r)dr for all y. (12)
The density function for the updated posterior distribution over Ω is10
ν(r|y) = g(y|r)π(r)/ν(y). (13)
Blackwell (1953) suggested a criterion that ranks diﬀerent information sys-
tems according to their informational contents. Suppose g1 and g2 are two
information systems with associated density functions ν1(·) and ν2(·). The
following criterion induces an ordering on the set of information systems.
Deﬁnition 1 (Informativeness) Let g1 and g2 be two information sys-
tems. g1 is said to be more informative than g2 (expressed by g1 inf g2,), if





0 = 1, (14)









holds for all r ∈ Ω.
10To ease notation we distinguish between the functions ν(y) and ν(r|y) only by their
arguments.Transparency in the Interbank Market 9
According to this criterion g1 inf g2, holds if g2 can be obtained from
g1 through a process of randomization. The probability density λ(y0,y) in
equation (13) transforms a signal y into a new signal y0. If the y0-values are
generated in this way, the information system g2 can be interpreted as being
obtained from the information system g1 by adding random noise. Note that
λ(·,·) in (14) is independent of r. Therefore, the signals under information
system g2 convey no information about the value of ˜ r that is not also conveyed
by the signals under information system g1. As a consequence, the a priori
posterior interest rate uncertainty under g1 will be lower than under g2.
Our notion of interbank market transparency is based on the informa-
tional content of the signal. A signal that conveys information about the
future interbank rate aﬀects the economic uncertainty to which the bank is
exposed. We characterize the interbank market as more transparent if the
signal, y, conveys more precise information about the future interbank rate,
r. Thus, higher interbank market transparency implies that interbank rate
risk is reduced through the dissemination of more reliable information.
Deﬁnition 2 (Interbank Market Transparency) Let g1 and g2 be two
information systems for the future interbank rate r. The interbank market is
said to be more transparent under g1 than under g2, if g1 inf g2.
The following lemma contains a property of information systems that
turns out to be a convenient tool for our analysis. The lemma formulates an
alternative transparency criterion that is equivalent to the condition stated
in Deﬁnition 2.
Lemma 1 The interbank market is more transparent under g1 than under



















holds for every convex function F(·) on the set of density functions over Ω.10
A proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Kihlstrom (1984). Note that ν1(·|y)
and ν2(·|y) are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems. Thus,
Lemma 1 implies that more transparency (weakly) raises the expectation
of any convex function of posterior beliefs. For concave functions, F, the
inequality is reversed.
3 Interbank Market Transparency, Volume of Loans, and Prof-
itability
We now turn to the question how the bank’s volume of loans is aﬀected as
the interbank market becomes more transparent. The loans decision, L, is
contingent on the signal y. We deﬁne the volume of loans, Lv, as the average
level of loans before the signal has been observed,
L




The following proposition characterizes the impact of more interbank
market transparency on the volume of loans in terms of the curvature of
the marginal cost function.
Proposition 1 (loans volume) Let g1 and g2 be two information systems
such that the interbank market is more transparent under g1 than under g2.
The volume of loans is higher (lower) under g1 than under g2, if the marginal
cost function C0(L) is concave (convex).
Proof: In view of (16) and Lemma 1, we have to show that the loans decision,
L(y), is convex (concave) in the updated posterior belief ν(r|y) if C0(L) is
a concave (convex) function. By (9), L(y) depends on ν(r|y) only via the
forward rate rf(y). Since rf(y) = E[˜ r|y] is linear in the posterior belief
ν(r|y), the loans decision L(y) will be convex (concave) in ν(r|y) if it is
convex (concave) in rf(y). Obviously, L(y) = (C0)−1(rL − rf(y)) is convexTransparency in the Interbank Market 11
(concave) in rf(y) if C0 is a concave (convex) function. The proof is complete.

According to Proposition 1, the role of more transparency on the inter-
bank market for the volume of loans depends only on the curvature of the
marginal cost function. In particular, under the standard speciﬁcation of de-
creasing returns to scale, more interbank market transparency may stimulate
or depress the volume of loans. If the cost function is quadratic and, hence,
the marginal cost function is linear (textbook example), the volume of loans
will not be aﬀected by more transparency in the interbank market.
We illustrate this result by comparing two information systems g1 and g2,
where g1 is fully informative and g2 is uninformative. Under the information
system g2, the signal y does not reveal any information about ˜ r. Thus, the





−1(rL − ¯ r). (17)
By contrast, under the information system g1, the signal reveals the future
interbank rate r and, hence, the forward rate is equal to r. In this case (9)





−1(rL − ˜ r)]. (18)




g2 if (C0)−1 is
convex (concave).
Next we analyze whether the proﬁtability of the banking business beneﬁts
from more interbank market transparency. We use ex ante expected proﬁts
as a measure for proﬁtability.
Proposition 2 (proﬁtability) Let g1 and g2 be two information systems






are higher under g1 than under g2.
Proof: Proceeding along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 1 we
need to show that

















is a convex function of rf(y). Diﬀerentiating (20) with respect to rf(y) yields
∂Π(y)
∂rf(y)
= (k + 1)K − (C
0)
−1(rL − rf(y)). (21)
The convexity of the cost function implies that (C0)−1(·) is monotone de-
creasing in rf(y). Therefore, (21) yields the convexity of the proﬁt function
in the interbank forward rate rf(y). 
According to Proposition 2, expected bank proﬁts increase with more in-
terbank transparency regardless of attitudes towards risk and of technological
parameters, as long as the cost function is convex.
The results in propositions 1 and 2 do not necessarily conﬁrm the common
view according to which transparency promotes economic eﬃciency: while
the banking sector gains from more transparency on the interbank market,
the economy as a whole may not. This is because higher transparency may
stiﬂe the process of ﬁnancial intermediation, thereby reducing the volume of
loans being extended to investors. These ﬁndings need to be interpreted cau-
tiously for at least two reasons. Firstly, they have been derived in a partial
equilibrium setting and may not survive without modiﬁcation in full equi-
librium.11 And secondly, the volume of extended loans is, at best, a rather
11In a diﬀerent context, the role of information in full equilibrium has been investigated
by Eckwert and Zilcha (2001,2003), Orosel (1996), Schlee (2001), and others.Transparency in the Interbank Market 13
crude indicator for economic eﬃciency. Obviously, extending the analysis to
a full equilibrium framework is an important task for the future.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the role of transparency in the interbank market
for the loan volume and for expected proﬁts of a competitive banking ﬁrm.
Interbank market transparency was deﬁned in terms of the informativeness
of a signal that conveys some information about the random interbank rate.
The loan volume and expected bank proﬁts were deﬁned by means of the ex
ante expected values for loans and proﬁts. Our analysis has produced two
main results: more transparency in the interbank market increases expected
bank proﬁts, but does not necessarily stimulate the loan volume. If the
bank’s marginal cost function is concave (convex), more interbank market
transparency leads to a higher (lower) loan volume.
Our analysis can be extended along several lines. Most importantly, a
generalization of the partial equilibrium character of the results would be
highly desirable. Furthermore, our proposed concept of transparency could
also be applied to credit risks rather than (or, in addition to) uncertainties
about interbank rates. Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) and Wong (1997)
have suggested modeling techniques for credit risks which can be combined
with our concept of transparency. In such a setting more transparency would
strengthen the ability of banks to diﬀerentiate between good and bad risks
within the pool of loan applicants. We leave this interesting application of our
transparency concept to the ﬁnancial intermediation process in the banking
industry for future research.14
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